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Competitive Reform in Health Care: The
Vulnerable Revolution
Thomas L. Greaneyt
The revolution in health care in the 1980s has generated the belief in
some quarters that the nation's long-simmering competition-versus-
regulation debate has been resolved in favor of competition. Those pre-
dicting rapidly growing alternative delivery systems and diminishing pro-
fessional sovereignty seem to assume that competition will inevitably gen-
erate sufficient momentum to overcome any residual regulatory or
professional obstacles.
But allocating health care resources by market principles is far from
unanimously accepted today. Moreover, an impressive array of legal, po-
litical, and social obstacles still impede competition. While private markets
for other goods and services have adapted and grown in spite of public
and private impediments, it is questionable whether health markets can do
the same. Indeed, if policymakers allow competitive reform to proceed
without addressing the severe disruptions it may cause, a powerful reregu-
lation backlash might emerge.
In arguing that reports of the triumph of competitive reform are prema-
ture, this Article should not be held to slight the considerable benefits to
consumer welfare that health care competition offers. Indeed, the results
in those states where competition has spread most quickly lend powerful
support to the argument that provider rivalry can produce quality health
care more cheaply than can traditional noncompetitive arrangements.'
However, policymakers may overlook these successes as competition forces
them to make many difficult choices.
This Article argues that policymakers should pay far greater attention
than they do at present to the regulatory apparatus that must evolve to
cope with transitional problems arising from the transformation of health
care financing and delivery systems. Moreover, the absence of a uniform
national policy addressing competitive reform may inhibit both its pace
and its effectiveness. Enthusiasm for market-based reform may produce
the mistaken notion that competitive markets obviate the need for govern-
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ment supervision. Recently, free-market advocates have broadly invoked
the purported self-correcting properties of the market to resist government
regulation. Where policing is necessary, they find self-regulation prefera-
ble to government involvement. However, this Article argues that judicial
and governmental intervention has been necessary to maintain and pro-
mote competitive health care markets and, moreover, that competition
would be short-lived in a totally deregulated environment. Ironically, com-
petitive health care may require some additional government involvement.
This Article examines the regulatory and legal context of the competi-
tive reform movement in health care. Part I surveys the role of the courts
in spurring competitive change and considers the political implications of
this background. Part II analyzes a number of public and private impedi-
ments to expanding the role of markets in health care. Part III considers
some likely consequences of continued competitive change and assesses the
claims of the groups most affected by deregulation. Part IV suggests some
regulatory measures necessary to minimize frictions, advance social goals,
and hasten political acceptance of competition in health care. The Conclu-
sion summarizes the policy options.
I. The Emergence of Competition in Health Care
Until relatively recently, the health care industry was essentially ex-
empt from competitive pressures, shielded as it was from the antitrust
laws and from significant pro-competitive legislation. Since the 1970s,
however, a combination of judicial action and changes in publicly funded
reimbursement programs has stripped the industry of most of its antitrust
immunity and subjected it to procompetitive reform, including laws en-
couraging HMOs and other alternative care providers. The details of the
move toward competition will be discussed in this Part, while the transi-
tional problems arising from the transformation of American health care
and delivery systems will be discussed in the Parts following.
A. The Role of Litigation in Imposing Competition
The regulatory reform movement that has profoundly changed the na-
tion's airline, railroad, trucking, telecommunications, and financial ser-
vices industries is one of the most significant developments in recent
American economic history. This movement reflects a broad consensus
that regulatory agencies have failed to accomplish various public objectives
because they have been captured by the institutions they were designed to
regulate.2 Deregulation of these industries was intensely debated nation-
2. For some influential discussions of this phenomenon from varying ideological bases, see
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ally and change was accomplished largely through federal legislation and
administrative action.'
Competitive growth in health care markets has proceeded quite differ-
ently. Because the most significant impediments to competition were im-
posed by private regulation," much of the deregulation of the health care
industry has been accomplished through litigation under the federal anti-
trust laws, mainly Section 1 of the Sherman Act5 and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.6
Many of the changes came in a series of opinions issued in the late
1970s and early 1980s, in which courts held that health care providers
and insurers did not enjoy various legal defenses that for many years had
been thought to immunize their conduct from antitrust challenge. Courts
disabused physicians of the notion that their activities were protected be-
cause they practiced a learned profession,7 eased standing and jurisdic-
tional requirements for bringing lawsuits,8 narrowed the scope of the stat-
utory immunity of insurers,9 and limited defenses predicated on prior
approval and review by state agencies"0 or on the existence of federal
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974); Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971).
3. Federal legislation has been instrumental in deregulating the following industries: Air trans-
portation, Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.); banking, Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 22, 42 U.S.C.) and
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 311, 709, 96 Stat.
1469, 1470, 1540 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); telecommunications, Record Carrier
Competition Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-130, 95 Stat. 1687 (codified as amended in 45 U.S.C. §
1017; 47 U.S.C. §§ 222, 609 (1982)) and Cable Communications Policy Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 98-
549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); securities, Securities Act Amendments
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 2-24, 27(b), 89 Stat. 97, 97-163 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-83
(1982)); transportation, Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 31, 45, 49 U.S.C.), Motor
Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 49
U.S.C.), Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 45, 49 U.S.C.), and Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, 94
Stat. 2011 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 28, 39, 49 U.S.C.). See generally Weiss, The Regula-
tory Reform Movement, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 10 (L. Weiss
& M. Klass eds. 1981) (early deregulation). On potential efficiency gains from deregulation and justi-
fications for governmental intervention in markets, see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
(1982).
4. Private regulation here refers to the assumption of control over price, output, quality, or other
competitive variables by private entities such as medical societies, committees, and private accrediting
and licensing groups or by informal or ad hoc understandings among providers.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
7. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (learned professions defense curtailed
for attorneys); see also Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (interpreting Goldfarb to exclude protection for medical care providers).
8. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
9. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
10. North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
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health planning laws." Perhaps most significant for health care providers,
the Supreme Court held in 1978 that professional practices in restraint of
trade could not be excused even when they were undertaken to preserve
quality or protect public safety.1" These opinions eliminated the special
treatment afforded business arrangements in the health care industry.
The examination of a wide variety of health practices through the lens
of antitrust law produced a number of significant changes in health care
institutions and professional relationships. Most importantly, antitrust lit-
igation helped remove a complex set of firewalls that had for many years
shielded health care providers from market discipline. By protecting pro-
fessional discretion, eliminating interference by third parties, and estab-
lishing the industry's control over such important economic variables as
the division of labor, reimbursement methods, and entry, these restraints
had supported each other and had thus made competition among provid-
ers almost unthinkable. The network of restraints and the absence of ef-
fective law enforcement in health care "allowed anticompetitive traditions
and attitudes to permeate public policy toward the industry."' 3
The elimination of private restraints affecting health care finance serves
as an illustration of how the profession's firewalls were gradually disman-
tled. Initially, antitrust cases' 4 helped promote the emergence of indepen-
dent buyers by lessening professional control over Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans and by challenging medical society boycotts of health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs). 5 In addition, successful legal challenges to
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985). But see Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987) (state action doctrine exempts peer review activity from antitrust
liability).
11. For discussions of the progression of cases applying antitrust principles to the health care
industry, see T. Greaney, Applying Antitrust Law to the Health Care Industry: History, Rationale
and Emerging Issues (Nov. 7, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Havighurst, The
Contributions of Antitrust Law to a Procompetitive Health Policy, in MARKET REFORMS IN
HEALTH CARE 295 (J. Meyer ed. 1983).
12. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). But see Wilk v.
American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 226-28 (7th Cir. 1983) (AMA refusal to associate with
chiropractors for medical reasons justifiable on professional grounds if means narrowly tailored), on
remand 671 F. Supp. 1465 (held unjustifiable on factual grounds).
13. Havighurst, supra note 11, at 300.
14. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Feminist Women's
Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Group Health Coop. v.
King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
15. HMOs are medical prepayment plans providing subscribers with specified health services in
return for advance fixed periodic payments. There are at least three basic forms of HMOs: staff
model HMOs in which the HMO employs physicians on a salaried basis, the group model form in
which the HMO contracts with a physician-sponsored entity to provide services, and the independent
practice association (IPA) form in which the HMO contracts with independent practitioners. Exten-
sive economic literature concerning HMOs shows that they reduce health care costs by introducing
risk-sharing incentives for hospitals and physicians. P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS
326-57 (1983); Spies, Friedland & Fox, Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems: HMOs and
PPOs, in HEALTH CARE COST MANAGEMENT: PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES 43 (P. Fox, W.
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the American Medical Association's ethical prohibitions against all forms
of contract medicine or underbidding by physicians helped today's compet-
itive medical plans proliferate.16 More recently, courts have refused to al-
low physician groups or hospital associations to bargain collectively with
third-party payers 17 or to pressure them to refrain from imposing cost-
saving measures. 8 Thus, for example, in 1986 the Supreme Court struck
down a collective agreement by Indiana dentists to refuse to provide X-
rays to third-party payers who needed them to evaluate the appropriate-
ness of the dental care. 9 The Court unanimously agreed that there was
no legal basis for allowing professional groups to interfere with the nor-
mal rules governing buyer-seller relationships.
B. Legislative Initiatives
Litigation has thus done much to impel competition in the health care
industry. In essence, the courts have presumed that market principles will
govern private economic arrangements unless the legislature enacts laws
that provide otherwise."0 This litigation has focused the attention of fed-
eral and state lawmakers on competition as an important policy option in
health care, thus prompting legislative and administrative actions that re-
inforced the movement toward greater competition.'
Goldbeck & J. Spies eds. 1984). See infra notes 28, 32 & 144.
16. American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 980 (1979), modified and enforced sub nom. American
Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). Until this successful
antitrust challenge by the FTC in the 1970s, the AMA's professional ethical norms had effectively
foreclosed price competition among physicians. These rules prohibited physicians from accepting "in-
adequate compensation" (defined as less than "the usual fees paid for the same kind of service and
class of people in the community"), soliciting patients directly or indirectly, "underbidding" other
physicians "in order to secure a contract", or otherwise agreeing to provide services for specified prices
or on a salary basis (referred to as "contract practice"). American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at
1011-12; see generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 304-06,
323-27, 397-98 (1982) (origins of ethical prohibitions); Greaney & Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored
Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Organizations, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 513,
531-37 (1987) (antitrust analysis of medical association standards); Weller, "Free Choice" as a Re-
straint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351,
1355-75 (1984) (same).
Earlier, the AMA had insisted that private insurance companies provide remuneration on a fee-for-
service basis at rates set by local medical societies, and had condemned HMOs as a form of "unethical
practice." American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 238-40 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
affid, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); see also Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose
and Politics, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 984 (1954).
17. Third-party payers include employers, insurers, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield programs.
18. United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986); Michigan
State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 264 (1983); United States v. Montana Nursing Home Ass'n, 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,852 (D. Mont. 1982) (consent decree); United States v. South Carolina
Health Care Ass'n, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,316 (D.S.C. 1980) (consent decree).
19. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986).
20. See cases cited supra notes 7-10.
21. See Havighurst, supra note 11, at 300-02.
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States have been particularly responsive to the claims of alternative care
providers, such as nurse-midwives, psychologists, and chiropractors, enact-
ing laws which assure these groups access to facilities and mandate insur-
ance reimbursement or prohibit discrimination in third-party payment for
their services.22 However, few states have adopted competitive contracting
for their Medicaid and indigent care programs, although a number have
elected to participate in demonstration programs.2" Federal legislative ini-
tiatives have included encouragement of HMOs through the HMO Act of
197324; more recent policies facilitating participation in Medicare by
HMOs and other forms of risk contracting;25 and policies affecting health
insurance for military and federal employees.26
Ultimately, however, the incremental nature of change-described as
"medicine's creeping revolution"27-may undermine its staying power.
The lack of a national debate on the wisdom of applying competitive poli-
cies to health markets gives few policymakers a stake in competition's suc-
cess. Fewer still have carefully considered the impact of this change or
concerned themselves with designing measures to cushion competition's
disruptive effects without vitiating its salutary effects.
II. Continuing Obstacles to the Emergence of a Competitive Market
Antitrust enforcement and recent legislation have not eliminated all pri-
vate and public barriers to competition. Although state and federal regula-
tion of health care markets has been relaxed greatly-most notably by
removing or weakening such supply-side controls as certificate-of-need
22. See infra notes 29-54 and accompanying text. On the role of and capacity of states to assume
greater responsibility for developing health care policy, see Thompson, New Federalism and Health
Care Policy: States and the Old Questions, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 647 (1986).
23. In 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) amended the Medicaid statute to permit states to establish
their own qualification standards for HMOs contracting with Medicaid and allow waivers of certain
Medicaid requirements, thus permitting selective contracting and other activities necessary to permit
alternative delivery systems to service Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in HMO or other prepaid
health plans. Over three-fourths of these enrollees come from four states, Arizona, California, Illinois,
and Michigan, that have aggressively pursued these programs. See Freund & Neuschler, Overview of
Medicaid Capitation and Case-Management Initiatives, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 21, 21-22
(Supp. 1986). Preliminary studies indicate that these programs are cost-effective, especially in states
that mandate participation in capitated systems and that have successful quality assurance programs.
Id. at 28-29.
24. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
25. See generally Langwell & Hadley, Capitation and the Medicare Program: History, Issues
and Evidence, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 9 (Supp. 1986) (history and analysis of HMO risk
contracting under Medicare). See also infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
26. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-13 (1982 & Supp. III 1987) (recent amendments to federal employee
health insurance laws require cost monitoring and encourage HMO membership).
27. Ellwood, Competition: Medicine's Creeping Revolution, in FINANCING HEALTH CARE: COM-
PETITION VERSUS REGULATION 69 (D. Yaggy & W. Anlyan eds. 1982).
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(CON) requirements 2"-deregulatory reform is far from complete. Health
care providers and insurers continue to be governed by myriad public reg-
ulations that may limit competitive forces. With a handful of states exper-
imenting with removing most regulatory restrictions and a larger number
adopting public utility-style rate and supply regulation, it is tempting to
conclude that a useful national experiment is under way. However, as
discussed below, a mixed and conflicting regulatory regime in health care
will likely undermine confidence in competitive solutions, thus encourag-
ing inadequate regulatory reform.
A. State Laws Inhibiting Selective Contracting
Third-party payers are increasingly using negotiation or competitive
bidding to contract with physicians and hospitals and to set fees, pay-
ments, and, importantly, utilization standards which govern the provision
of care to patients. Market failures such as moral hazard2" and informa-
tion asymmetries"0 make this process of competitive or selective con-
tracting between providers and payers central to market-based reform in
health care.3" Thus, most procompetitive strategies rely on competition
among rival provider groups to bid down the amount of reimbursement
and to determine which costs are properly reimbursable. 2
28. State certificate-of-need laws require that health care providers obtain prior approval from a
state agency before making capital expenditures of specified amounts or instituting costly new services.
Most analysts and empirical studies have sharply criticized this form of regulation because it creates
artificial incentives to increase use of unregulated services, fails to constrain expansion by health facili-
ties, and discourages the use of cost-effective alternative facilities. See, e.g., C. HAVIGHURSr, DER-
EGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING FOR COMPETITION 195-222 (1982); P. Jos-
ROW, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 76-99, 138-68
(1981); Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospects for Health Planning: The Importance of Incentives, Stan-
dards, and Procedures in Certificate of Need, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 83. Until recently, federal law
conditioned availability of certain federal health care funds on a state's usage of certificate-of-need
programs to curtail expenditures. See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300k (1982)). Legislation has re-
cently been enacted to make state participation voluntary. Medicare & Medicaid Patient Protection
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 680,
29. "Moral hazard" occurs when insurance lessens incentives for the insured to protect against
loss, thus increasing the likelihood of loss. In health care, moral hazard is seen as the overuse of such
care due to its low marginal cost under traditional forms of health insurance and the patient's and
physician's consumption of more resources. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
30. Information asymmetries result when, due to differing willingnesses to pay information costs,
potential bargainers bring different amounts of information to the bargaining process. This results in
relatively poor bargaining by the less-informed party and thus in economic inefficiency. See G. CAIA-
BRFSI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 150-51 (1970).
31. For a discussion of the way in which selective contracting may mitigate market failures in
health care, see Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 16, at 537-49.
32. See, e.g., A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PI.AN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOAR-
ING COST OF MEDICAl. CARE 70-78, 110-13, 119 (1980); Proposals to Restructure the Financing of
Private Health Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 5740 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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However, state laws governing such areas as insurance, nonprofit insur-
ers, freedom of choice of providers, and mandated benefits constrain the
ability of provider panels to engage in selective contracting and to compete
with each other. While virtually every state has some regulatory appara-
tus affecting contracting, their provisions and effects vary widely. In many
states the effect is benign."8 In some cases, however, state requirements
discourage or block competitive bidding entirely.8 Overall, these limits
may suppress vigorous selective contracting by making the status of the
law uncertain and by providing a convenient rationalization for provider
intransigence.
The most significant limitation on selective contracting occurs in the
nine states that regulate hospital rates."5 In these states, regulatory mecha-
nisms determine the rates that third-party payers pay for hospital services
and the services of hospital-based physicians. Although a number of states
with rate regulation permit hospitals to negotiate discounts with preferred
provider organizations (PPOs),8" most impose limitations on the type and
size of any agreed-upon discount. Connecticut, for example, allows hospi-
33. For example, some states require that a plan's conditions and terms be established in advance
and be used as a basis for "open" negotiations. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 982h (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987); see also RAND CORPORATION, STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 24-25 (1986) [hereinafter RAND STUDY] (interviews with
PPOs' sponsors indicating that, depending on latitude given to set terms and conditions in advance,
such provisions may not interfere significantly with selective contracting).
34. See infra note 35.
35. The following states control hospital rates, typically by regulating both total hospital revenues
and the rates that all payers are charged for care: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-145
to 166 (West 1985); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 381 (1986); Maryland, MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-201 to -220 (Supp. 1985); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6A,
§§ 31-77 (West 1987); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-4.1 (West 1987); New York, N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.39.030 to .39.910 (1975 & Supp. 1987); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-5F-I to -6
(1985); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 54.01 to .31 (West 1987). Although state rate regulation has
had some success in slowing the rate of increase in hospital costs, empirical studies fail to provide any
evidence that rate-setting provides greater cost savings than competitive alternatives. See Eby &
Cohodes, What Do We Know About Rate-Setting?, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 299 (1985)
(comprehensive survey of studies of state rate regulation concluding that, although mandatory rate-
setting has constrained per diem hospital costs, there is no direct evidence that total health costs have
been constrained and that rate-setting states differ from other states in ways that are likely to make
rate setting less effective in the latter). Cf Mitchell, Issues, Evidence and the Policymakers Dilemma,
HEAT'H AFF., Summer 1982, at 89; Sloan, Rate Regulation as a Strategy for Hospital Cost Control:
Evidence from the Last Decade, 61 MII.BANK MEMORIAl. FUND Q. 195 (1983); see also RAND
STUrDY, supra note 33, at 55.
36. Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are arrangements in which services are provided to
enrollees by an organization or panel of providers, usually at a discount. Unlike HMO members,
enrollees are not required to use preferred providers, though they have economic incentives to do so.
The providers also agree to abide by the PPO's controls on service use. See Spies, Friedland & Fox,
supra note 15, at 45; Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 16, at 515-22. PPOs differ from HMOs
because PPO providers assume no risk for aggregate patient costs, as do HMOs. In addition, PPOs
save little, if at all, from practice integration or economies of scale. Greaney & Sindelar, supra note
16 at 538-49.
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tals to extend discounts only for certain demonstrated efficiencies: prompt
payment (up to two percent) and administrative cost savings (up to one
and one-half percent)., Other states require that PPOs wishing to enter
into negotiated discounts with providers must demonstrate to a rate-setting
commission that the discounts are economically justified and will not cause
cost-shifting to other payers.88 Finally, most states regulating rates also
continue to limit capital expenditures and facility expansion through
CON controls."9 This form of regulation interferes with competitive con-
tracting by constraining hospitals, free-standing delivery centers, and
group practices from developing ways to compete with established provid-
ers. Not surprisingly, PPO development has been slowest in states with
rate regulation.4 °
Other state laws restricting selective contracting are so-called freedom-
of-choice or antidiscrimination statutes.' These laws generally prohibit
third-party payers from restricting their insureds' ability to obtain reim-
bursement regardless of which provider is chosen or from paying different
amounts to different providers who provide the same service. Virtually
every state has some law or administrative regulation that may impede
bargaining or restrict an insurer's ability to channel patients to low-cost
providers. 2 According to a recent study, administrative and judicial inter-
pretations of these laws may have blunted their impact in a number of
jurisdictions. 3 Nevertheless, these laws may undermine the vigor of nego-
tiation by lessening the reward to successful bidders."" Moreover, the in-
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-166(d) to -166(e) (West 1985).
38. RAND STUDY, supra note 33, at 55.
39. Congress has recently repealed all federal requirements regarding state CON programs (pre-
vious amendments had removed most federal compulsion). Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3743, 3799 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300(m)(6)) (repealing Title XV of the Public Health Service Act, effective Jan. 1, 1987, including 42
U.S.C. § 300 (m)(6), which provided for state CON programs). The repeal did not affect any funds
obligated for purposes of Title XV before Jan. 1, 1987. State CON programs are voluntary and
subject to the discretion of the states, but approximately 35 have CON programs. Widespread removal
of these programs is unlikely in the near future. See Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate
of Need Regulation of Health Facilities to State Control, 19 IND, L. REV. 1025, 1086-87, 1110-11
(1986).
40. RAND STUDY, supra note 33, at 56-57.
41. Freedom-of-choice statutes typically forbid insurance companies to require that insureds ob-
tain services from particular hospitals or providers. One common variant of such statutes also requires
that insurers be left free to choose nonphysician providers. Antidiscrimination statutes assume that
providers do not discriminate (for example, in fees, premiums or rates) among insureds of the same
class using health services. Virtually all states have antidiscrimination statutes and over half have
some form of freedom-of-choice law that may limit selective contracting. RAND STUDY, supra note 33,
at 22-25. See also Weller, supra note 16, at 1351-91.
42. RAND STUDY, supra note 33, at 28-33.
43. Id.
44. Interviews with insurers and third-party payers suggest that considerable uncertainty exists
about the meaning and future application of laws of this kind. In addition, these laws have made some
third parties wary about excluding providers and may have deterred some from engaging in selective
contracting. Id.
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consistent state and federal laws designed to protect allied health profes-
sionals may also impair efficient contracting. Nonphysician groups that
have won guarantees of equal treatment are generally those that have
been able to exert political pressure in state legislatures or Congress;
where nonphysicians have been poorly organized, they have not achieved
legislative protection."' More fundamentally, requiring equal or compara-
ble reimbursement across provider groups fundamentally alters the alloca-
tion of risk and strategic elements of bargaining, thus undermining the
price-lowering effects of selective contracting.
Recognizing the potential of these laws to curb development of alterna-
tive financing systems, twenty-two states have enacted PPO enabling
laws."" In general, these statutes are designed to facilitate selective con-
tracting and override freedom-of-choice and antidiscrimination laws. Iron-
ically, many such laws have imposed their own regulatory restrictions. on
contracting.47 To date, only three states, California, Iowa, and Nebraska,
have enacted completely permissive statutes."' Most other states require
equal or nondiscriminatory treatment of providers or delineate the terms
of discount agreements. For example, many such enabling laws require
that payers must provide reimbursement to any provider willing to meet
specified requirements, while others limit the differential between what
the payer may pay its preferred panel and what it must pay to all
others.49
By removing or constraining an insurer's ability to promise benefits to
its select panel of providers benefits in exchange for fee discounts and
utilization limitations, these laws tend to undermine the cost-saving poten-
tial of competitive negotiation. Although federally qualified HMOs and
self-funded insurance plans are for the most part exempt from such stat-
utes,5" they may be subject to similarly restrictive state regulations. As
45. Havighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision-Making in the Health-Care Sector, 11 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 697, 705-09 (1986).
46. RAND STUDY, supra note 33, at 28-29.
47. See, e.g., RAND STUDY, supra note 33, at 40-51.
48. CAL.. INS. CODE §§ 10133-10133.6, 11512-11512.11 (West Supp. 1987); CAL.. WEI.F. &
INST. CODE §§ 14165-14165.10 (West Supp. 1987); IOwA CoDE ANN. §§ 508.29, 515.485.a (West
Supp. 1987); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-4101 to -4113 (1984).
49. For example, in Maryland insurers may not reimburse non-panel providers at a rate below
20% of the rate they pay preferred providers. MD. ANN. CODE art.'48A, § 470X(b)(4) (1986).
50. The HMO Act exempts federally qualified HMOs from state freedom-of-choice and antidis-
crimination laws. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a) (1982). While the Act enumerates a number of insurance
regulations that are preempted, the list may not be exhaustive. Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Schweiker,
553 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1983). The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§1001-1461 (1982)) relieves self-funded employer or union-underwritten plans from state regulation
except those laws regulating insurance. Whether ERISA preempts state laws mandating reimburse-
ment for certain providers is unclear. See Note, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated Provider
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discussed below, state laws mandating benefits, requiring use of certain
classes of providers, or regulating premium rates can affect their competi-
tiveness. 1 To the extent, however, that self-insured plans escape burden-
some state regulations and taxes imposed on commercial insurers and
health service corporations, they may enjoy an advantage. Some critics
contend that these laws unfairly penalize employers too small to self-
insure." These laws may also create artificial incentives for some employ-
ers to choose one organizational form (and degree of risk) over another.
Other laws may also affect competitive contracting. For example, state
laws and regulations governing advertising, controlling entry and expan-
sion through CONs and credentialling, and limiting the corporate practice
of medicine have all restricted provider rivalry in the past. 3 While legal
precedent and administrative inaction may have diminished the signifi-
cance of these regulations, most could readily be revived by states. Indeed,
recent Supreme Court decisions encouraging federalism and strengthening
the state action defense to claims under federal antitrust laws suggest that
those seeking to contain the growth of competition in health care could
readily do so through state regulation. 5'
B. Private Restraints on Competition
Another obstacle to competitive reform is the possibility that private
restraints of trade may undermine the workings of emerging markets. As
suggested above, the medical profession has enjoyed de facto immunity
from the effects of competition for most of this century." While legal doc-
trine and public attitudes have changed significantly, health care profes-
sionals still retain a powerful ethos fundamentally hostile toward competi-
tive change. Thus, it is not surprising that a great many lawsuits brought
under the antitrust laws involve the health care industry. This suggests
that private collusive actions to curb competition are unlikely to disappear
quickly. In an era of declining law enforcement budgets,5" it is unclear
Laws, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1194; cf Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(state regulation mandating minimum health benefits for insureds not preempted by ERISA as it
applies to insurance plans subject to Act).
51. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., RAND STUDY, supra note 33, at 69-70.
53. See sources cited supra note 11.
54. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
55, See generally Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing,
1978 DUKE L.J. 303.
56. The staff of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice decreased by
nearly one-half during the 1980s. Adminstration Unveils More Budget Data, [Jan.-Jun.] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1300, at 157 (Jan. 29, 1987).
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whether health care professionals will be able to reassert guild principles
through private restraints of trade."'
As noted above, a web of ethical norms, institutional arrangements, and
formal and informal agreements has historically shielded providers from
competition. Although cataloguing the rich variety of trade restraints de-
vised by health professionals is outside the scope of this article, recent
experience suggests that cartelizing schemes have not disappeared. In
1986, for example, the United States Department of Justice successfully
prosecuted a case in which the hospitals of North Dakota had held meet-
ings and had collectively agreed under the auspices of their trade associa-
tion to refuse to extend discounts to the Indian Health Service."8 The Jus-
tice Department has also challenged payment plans sponsored by local
medical societies which were nothing more than thinly-veiled agreements
among local physicians to block aggressive HMOs and PPOs. 9
Particularly vulnerable to future anticompetitive activities are the seams
in the system where buyers seek independent competitive responses from
health professionals. A prominent example is provider contracting. Payers
and consumers can benefit from competitive bidding or negotiations only if
providers do not collaborate. Successful collusion destroys economic effi-
ciency. Another example occurs where the market calls for professional
judgments that overlap with the economic self-interest of those supplying
the professional judgments. Peer review 0 and credentialling 5 decisions
57. Medical guild principles are generally those rules and norms that historically enabled medical
associations to assume responsibility for determining "the amount of production, for prices, and for
the competitive relations of their members." Weller, supra note 16, at 1355 n.23, (quoting AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASS'N, AN INTRODUCTION To MEDICAL ECONOMICS 19 (1935)). This approach to market
organization obviously conflicts directly with the market model which regards professionals as sepa-
rate economic entities competing with each other over price and other factors. Id. at 1355-59.
58. United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986).
59. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). The Department of
Justice has pursued enforcement actions against efforts by local medical organizations to form PPOs
in order to preempt competition. See Remarks of J. Paul McGrath before the 33rd Annual American
Bar Association Antitrust Spring Meeting 4-7 (Mar. 22, 1985).
60. Peer review refers to reviewing such things as quality of care, the reasonableness of fees,
compliance with ethical standards, and the medical necessity of treatment. These functions are pro-
vided for diverse authorities (governmental agencies, third-party payers, hospitals) and by a variety of
entities (medical societies, hospital staff committees). Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the
Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1117 (1986). Havighurst focuses on community-wide
physician peer-review bodies examining private-sector care for use by such independent deci-
sionmakers as insurers. Such organizations might review professional fees, resource utilization, or
quality of care. Id. at 1123-27. Historically, peer review activities have been intimately linked with
professional efforts to maintain price levels and homogenize practice patterns. Id.; P. STARR, supra
note 16, at 44-47, 57-58, 102-07. At the same time, payers and governmental agencies require pro-
fessional assistance to overcome their information handicaps. It is difficult to resolve disputes involving
private peer review actions because competitively impermissible motives and legitimate quality of care
issues may often both be present in peer review actions. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987).
61. Health care credentialling refers to a variety of public and private mechanisms for certifying
professionals and institutions as suitable for providing health care services. State licensing statutes, for
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are two examples. Finally, structural or organizational arrangements
among providers in local markets can dictate the competitiveness of those
markets. Hospital mergers, over-inclusive Individual Practice Associations
(IPAs)"2 or provider-controlled PPOs, and large physician group practices
or joint ventures can in some cases reduce competitiveness among provid-
ers and hence dilute the effectiveness of competitive contracting. When the
number of competing entities is reduced so that only a few sellers remain
-an oligopolistic market-prices and other competitive variables tend not
to be optimal.6
The risks of private anticompetitive activity indicate that enthusiasm for
market-driven reforms should not diminish vigorous enforcement of anti-
trust laws. Large profits tend to elicit opportunistic behavior, and, as dis-
cussed above, competition in the health care industry has been particularly
vulnerable to subversion. Regrettably, as we have been reminded by the
securities industry, professionals are not immune from these temptations.
Self-regulation is not a reliable substitute for public law enforcement.
C. The Government as Purchaser of Health Services: Lagging Behind
the Private Sector
Because government programs consume nearly forty percent of all
health care expenditures,"' they can dictate the pace of change in the
example, regulate entry and supervise quality standards for physicians, allied health practitioners and,
to a limited extent, institutions such as hospitals and nursing homes. Private credentialling includes
certification of professionals through various means such as professional specialty boards, institutional
providers by entities such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, and the scope of
professional practice within institutions through peer control over staff privileges. For an excellent
analysis of public and private quality assurance programs, see T. Jost, The Necessary and Proper
Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care (Nov. 7, 1987) (forthcoming in 10 Hous. L.
REV.). For analyses of competitive risks in credentialling, see Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An
Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1075-76 & n.13 (1984)
(physician control over staff privileges); Havighurst & King, Private Credentialling of Health Care
Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 131 (1982) (benefits of competitive creden-
tialling entities); Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of
Health Care and Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REV. 835 (1983) (hospital accreditations); Kissam, Gov-
ernment Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other
Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1 (physician accreditation).
62. IPAs are medical plans that contract with solo practitioners and small practice groups. These
are thus distinct from HMOs that deliver care from central sites. If too many physicians join an IPA,
it effectively becomes a cartel. It will thus set prices to maximize profit, which may well be uncompe-
titively high. See Spies, Friedland & Fox, supra note 15, at 47.
63. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 151-68
(2d ed. 1980); 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLFS AND THEIR APPLICATION 54-60 (1980); Weiss, The Concentration Profits Relationship and
Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATrION: THE NEw LEARNING 189 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann
& J. Weston eds. 1974). For an application of oligopoly theory to physician joint ventures, specifically
over-inclusive provider-sponsored PPOs, see Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 16, at 576-78, 582-89.
64. Medicare payments, totalling $70.5 billion in 1985, make up approximately 50% of the total
governmental health care payments. Medicaid and state and local indigent care programs constitute
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health care industry. Competition in health care markets would be mark-
edly enhanced by competitive techniques such as bidding, vouchers, and
selective contracting by state, local and federal governments. Such a policy
shift would hasten physician acceptance of contract medicine, awaken em-
ployers to alternative arrangements, and enhance consumer awareness of
the potential benefits of panel medicine in lieu of the arrangements they
have previously accepted.
To date, however, governmental agencies have been slow to adopt mar-
ket principles. Indeed, they have lagged behind the private sector in using
contracting methods to effect cost savings. Most states continue to use cost
reimbursement in their Medicaid programs, relying upon such regulatory
tools as eligibility, benefit design, and fee controls to limit costs. Only a
few states, most notably California and Arizona, have turned to large-
scale selective contracting programs in their Medicaid programs."5 At the
other extreme, nine states have adopted some form of explicit rate regula-
tion of hospitals.66 These states generally permit a governmental agency to
set rates based upon the historic costs of each hospital or of categories of
hospitals. Significantly, under all-payer regulatory schemes, these
governmentally-set rates apply to both public programs and private insur-
ance. Rate-setting regulation's success in controlling to some degree inpa-
tient costs encourages proposals to extend fee controls to other sectors of
the industry.
The federal government has given only modest encouragement to com-
petitive approaches to cost control in Medicare.67 Instead of giving Medi-
the remainder. Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Medicare Prospective Payment and the
American Health Care System; Report to Congress, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) No. 517, at
12 (extra ed. March 23, 1987) [hereinafter ProPAC Report].
65. See supra note 1. A number of Medicaid programs have begun demonstration projects for
contracting with alternative delivery systems authorized under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2178, 95 Stat. 357, 873-74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
300e, 1395-96 (1982 & Supp. 1986)). Preliminary evaluations of the costs and access to care in these
demonstration projects have been favorable. Freund & Neuschler, Overview of Medicaid Capitation
and Case-Management Initiatives, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 21 (Supp. 1986).
66. See supra note 23. For an analysis of rate-setting methods used by several states with all-
payer regulation, see Meyer, Financing Uncompensated Care With All-Payer Rate Regulation, in
UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 167 (F. Sloan, J. Blumstein &
J. Perrin eds. 1986). These programs may control health care costs ineffectively over time. See infra
notes 111-14. However, recent studies show that rate-setting schemes have proved effective in the few
years in which they have operated. See, e.g., Thorpe, Does All-Payer Rate Setting Work? The Case of
the New York Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology, 12 J. HEALTH POL. POL'¥ & L.
391 (1987).
67. See infra note 142 (HMO Act largely ineffective). However, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) is contemplating modifying traditional Medicare Part B (physician services)
coverage to provide financial incentives for consumers to use PPOs for medical care. HHS Devising
PPO Plan for Medicare Payment of Physician Services, HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., Nov. 1987, at 1,
1-2. As discussed above, the government has a critical role in setting standards and bargaining over
the terms of PPO provider contracts.
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care beneficiaries strong incentives to join HMOs or other competitive
plans, for the first fifteen years of the program the federal government
refused to reimburse HMOs on the same basis as other Medicare provid-
ers. Then, three years after Congress authorized the use of per capita
payment, the government began to reimburse HMOs on a basis that made
it attractive only for certain beneficiaries to join.68 In addition, the Reagan
Administration abruptly changed policies in 1983, embracing a prospec-
tive payment system (PPS) for Medicare.69 While heralded by some pro-
ponents as a step toward competitive reform, PPS is regarded by others as
giving strong support to system-wide rate regulation."
Whatever the direction in which it propels public policy, prospective
payment suffers from the serious defects that make administered pricing
plans poor substitutes for market-driven prices. One recognized difficulty
with most forms of rate regulation is the regulator's tendency to resolve
issues in favor of the regulated entity. In health care it is particularly
difficult for them to resist the claims of health professionals, especially
when these professionals appeal for resources that will be used in life-
saving enterprises. A second problem with regulation is the considerable
uncertainty inherent in the process of evaluating competing claims for
scarce health care monies. As argued below,71 the link between health
expenditures and effective cures is poorly understood even with respect to
well-established procedures and technology. Ex ante evaluations of new
technologies are even more problematic. 71 Moreover, most regulators are
68. Before 1985, requirements for participation in HMO contracting with Medicare were highly
restrictive and unattractive to potential contracting. Regulations that became effective February 1,
1985 allow for risk contracts on a capitation basis at 95% of the average per capita cost adjusted for
age, sex, disability, and other factors and subject to other requirements that may reduce the plan's
ability to retain surpluses. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN
SERVICES: STRATEGIES FOR MEDICARE 7-51 (1986).
69. In 1983, Congress adopted a prospective payment system to be phased in over a four year
period beginning in 1984. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601(c)(1), 97
Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. III 1985)). Under the new system, the
Medicare program pays hospitals fixed, prospectively-determined prices based on the patient's diagno-
sis. The fixed amounts are determined by which of 470 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) the patient
falls into, subject to certain cost adjustments for certain hospitals and "outliers" (cases involving un-
usually high costs). DRGs comprise a means by which patients are grouped into homogeneous catego-
ries with respect to specific diagnostic, therapeutic, and demographic criteria in order that the costs
appropriate for substantially similar patients be relatively uniform. HHS is required to update pay-
ment rates annually by adjusting for inflation, technology, and other factors comprising the component
cost elements of the system and recalibrating the DRG weights. Id. at §§ 1395(d)(2)(9)(D) &
(d)(3)(A). Congress also established the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (ProPAC) to
make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on updating payment rates and modifying DRGs as
well as to assess the impact of PPS on the American health care system.
70. Morone & Dunham, Slouching Toward National Health Insurance: The New Health Care
Politics, 2 YAt.E J. ON REG. 263 (1985).
71. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
72. For analyses of the problems of evaluating and regulating changes in medical technology, see
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIES FOR MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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not well equipped to make such evaluations. Finally, the familiar observa-
tion that reducing health expenditures is not synonymous with reducing
the total costs of illness has particular bearing on the efficacy of regulatory
solutions. Cost-saving mechanisms like price and supply regulation that
do not give providers incentives to reduce the total cost of illness are likely
to be ineffective in constraining overall costs. 3 Nonetheless, because these
approaches may produce quick and politically attractive savings in pro-
gram budgets, they may have considerable appeal to policymakers.
Medicare's PPS system illustrates some of the problems inherent in
regulatory solutions. Because of the enormous inefficiency and perverse
rewards that drove the cost-based system that preceded it,7 4 prospective
payment has achieved some measure of savings. By assigning fixed pay-
ment rates to inpatient hospital services and procedures, Congress has
deployed price controls that cause inpatient costs to increase less rapidly
than others in the health care system, which are still largely tied to cost-
based reimbursement principles.71
There are reasons to be skeptical about the efficacy of shifting cost-
control policy to the supply side, as prospective payment does. PPSs yield
administered prices, not market prices.7 Efficient providers cannot take
away business from the inefficient and thus force cost containment upon
them. Indeed, the PPS system does nothing to discourage admissions, and
may even encourage them. To control admissions, Medicare relies on
peer review organizations (PROs).7 These organizations employ adminis-
(1982); Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste
Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778 (1986). Although in principle prospective payment seems to
eliminate the need for coverage evaluation, peer review organizations, see infra note 78 and accompa-
nying text, may deny payment on DRG claims that reflect technologies not approved by Medicare.
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION MANUAL 59 (1986). More fun-
damentally, the prospective payments system entails an administrative determination of which technol-
ogies will be classified in certain DRGs, thus recalibrating DRG payment rates to reflect new or
changing technologies. See Chu, Health Care Cost Containment and Technology Assessment, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 884, 904 (1986).
73. See A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 32, at 93-113; P. JOSKOW, supra note 28, at 71.
74. See supra note 32; Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 16, at 525-28.
75. For example, Medicare inpatient expenditures (those covered by PPS) showed a real growth
rate of 1.3% in 1985, compared to the real growth rate of 6.5% in total Medicare expenditures.
ProPAC Report, supra note 64, at 12. Interpreting the effects of PPS is complicated by data limita-
tions, changing demographics and health patterns among the elderly, and substitution of various ser-
vices not under PPS for inpatient care. Id. at 11.
76. See Enthoven & Noll, Prospective Payment: Will It Solve Medicare's Financial Problems?, 1
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 101, 112 (1984).
77. Id.
78. Peer review organizations (PROs) are private organizations primarily controlled by physi-
cians that contract with HHS, among other organizations, to monitor hospitals' inpatient services to
Medicare beneficiaries by retrospectively reviewing to insure that services are medically necessary,
reasonable, and cost-effective. PRO enforcement authority consists primarily of the power to deny
payments to hospitals. Secondarily, in some cases, PROs refer practitioners to HHS for additional
sanctions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1320c-12 (1982). See Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the
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trative controls which have high transaction and information costs and are
unlikely to be as effective as incentive-based controls.79  Governmentally
set prices also determine which technologies are rewarded, forcing the reg-
ulator to choose between procedural and cognitive therapies and to make
countless other decisions in setting relative rates. In addition, economic
analysis suggests that under prospective payment an efficient supply of
hospital services will be provided only in the unlikely case that physicians
act as perfect agents for their patients."0 If, as is far more likely, physi-
cians are more responsive to incentives provided by the hospital, then hos-
pital services will be undersupplied as physicians help hospitals meet
DRG-inspired goals. There will also be strong incentives for hospitals to
attract low-risk patients by increasing advertising, amenities, and
promotions.
Finally, the administrative structure for PPS rate setting is subject to
political intervention. As the forces described above drive up the costs of
even the most efficient hospitals, HHS, or, more likely, Congress may ease
price pressures by raising PPS reimbursement."1 As one authority con-
cluded, rate setting under PPS in its first years demonstrates "Congress's
ability to control the rate-setting process politically"8 2 with results that
appear to have served the financial interests of the regulated entity. 3
Medicare Prospective Payment System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Medical Resources
Under a Government Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REV. 1151, 1179-80 (1986).
79. Kinney, supra note 78; see also Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with QualitylCost Trade-
offs in Medical Care: The Role of PROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6 (1975). Although PROs differ in
many respects from physician service review organizations (PSROs), the problems inherent in imple-
menting retrospective review, difficulties in making trade-offs between cost and quality, uncertainty
about PRO policy objectives, and the difficulties in setting standards by contract make it unclear how
effective this form of regulation will be. See generally B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R.
SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 419-29 (1987); Kinney, supra note 78, at 1190-93.
80. Ellis & McGuire, Provider Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing and
Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129 (1986).
81. The initial experience of HHS and Congress in updating payment rates supports this analy-
sis. Proposals by HHS to freeze hospital payment rates for fiscal year 1986 and allow only a 5%
increase in 1987 met strong resistance from the American Hospital Association and other interest
groups; as a result, Congress approved higher rate increases. See Kinney, supra note 78, at 1182-87.
In addition, ProPAC has a large role in the process, principally by providing "Congress [with] the
information that it needs to substitute its own judgments for those of the executive branch in this
complex, highly technical area, through the political process." Id. at 1187.
82. Id. at 1196.
83. The Office of the Inspector General of HHS strongly criticized the high profit margins real-
ized by hospitals under PPS, reporting that for fiscal year 1985 (Sept. 1, 1985 to Aug. 31, 1986)
hospital profit rates from PPS averaged 15.3%, up from 14.8% in fiscal year 1984. Will Profit Data
Drive Medicare Policy?, HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1987, at 28. In fiscal year 1984, the first year of PPS,
82% of 2,099 PPS providers studied earned profits averaging $1.3 million per facility, resulting in a
net profit margin of about 15% on Medicare revenues and a return on investment (equity) of 25%.
Eighteen percent of the sampled hospitals incurred losses averaging $155,000 per facility, so that
average profits were eight times average losses. Inspector General Memorandum on Financial Im-
pact of PPS, 11986 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 35,420 (May 30, 1986).
Aggregate Medicare payments are expected to exceed aggregate costs by 11.5% in fiscal year 1987.
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D. The Tort System
A final impediment to achieving cost savings through enhanced compe-
tition is the tort system. The threat of malpractice actions may impose
social costs by fostering excessive care (defensive medicine) and discourag-
ing cost-efficient decisionmaking by providers. 4 Although the extent to
which the tort system actually causes physicians to practice defensive
medicine is unclear,85 fear of malpractice judgments coupled with faltering
malpractice insurance markets may, at the margin, place limits on the
economizing potential of market based reforms. For example, physicians
worried about potential malpractice claims may simply be unwilling to
undertake the large personal risks associated with joining the most cost-
effective alternative delivery systems.
Moreover, the legal standard used to determine liability in malpractice
actions tends to compel practice styles that may be costly and unnecessary
in an attempt to insure the safety of patients. Conversely, that standard of
care may discourage innovative practice arrangements associated with
competitive payment systems. Under tort law, physicians are judged by
whether their actions depart from the prevailing reasonable or customary
practice.88 The consequence of this standard may be to buttress doctors'
resistance to economical practice styles or technologies. This risk is under-
scored by case law suggesting that a single standard of care applies in
malpractice actions regardless of the cost containment objectives of a pay-
ment system's utilization control mechanism and that physicians may be
personally liable for malpractice in such situations despite the pressures
exerted on them by such mechanisms.8 Therefore, unless the threat of
malpractice claims is eased by tort reform or by other means, the cost-
saving potential of alternative delivery systems may be limited.
Although a variety of proposals have been put forward to solve the mal-
practice dilemma, none seems likely to resolve the problems discussed
here. The many proposals to reform the tort system have yet to prove
their efficacy.88 Moreover, even if successful, these reforms run the risk of
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS: A
REPORT TO THE SENATE & HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET-PART II 69 (1987).
84. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 146-50
(1985).
85. Id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MAIPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON THE
PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS 34-35 (1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Moreover, cost-based reim-
bursement itself is probably responsible for much defensive medicine because it permits doctors to
disregard cost when ordering care. Hence, the extent to which tort reform would alleviate this prob-
lem is unclear.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §299A (1965).
87. See, e.g., Wickline v. California, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
88. Reform proposals include caps on liability, common law restrictions on contingency fees, mod-
ification of such doctrines as the collateral source rule, the use of arbitration panels, and others. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 85, at 18-21, 83.
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undermining the traditional quality assurance function that the tort sys-
tem provides.89 Given the inadequacy of existing regulatory regimes in
monitoring and policing incompetent practitioners,9 ° this may be a high
price to pay. A second group of reform proponents argue that marketplace
competition among health plans can alleviate the malpractice crisis by
placing contractual limits on liability through such means as caps on
awards, no-fault principles of claim resolution, and mandated alternative
dispute resolution procedures.91 Most importantly, the potential for alter-
ing by contract the standard of care applicable to alternative delivery sys-
tems could provide some protection against excessive awards.9 2 However,
because contract-based solutions to malpractice risks rely on judicial en-
forcement, their effectiveness remains uncertain.93 Moreover, if, as some
contend,94 actual malpractice claims may vastly understate the actual
quantity of medical negligence, these contractual remedies may prove far
more costly than it now appears. In any event, the efficacy of malpractice
law reform is likely to influence the efficacy of competitive approaches to
reforming health care delivery as well.
III. Conducting the Social Triage
I have argued that a shift to competitive markets will significantly alter
relationships and reshape health care institutions. For a number of
groups, these changes will have significant economic consequences that
will in turn generate political side effects. For competitive reform to suc-
89. See Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empiri-
cal Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH Pot. Poty & L. 629, 643 (1985) (finding "no indication that ...
state legislative actions had their intended effects on premiums"); cf Danzon, The Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1986)
(analyzing impact of such factors as urbanization, business cycles, and tort reforms on number of
malpractice claims).
90. See infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Havighurst, Reforming Malpractice Law Through Consumer Choice, HEALTH
AFF., Winter 1984, at 63.
92. See Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Ob-
stacles, 49 LAW & CONrEMP. PROBS. 143, 148-49 (1986) (arguing for flexible standards in malprac-
tice actions to take into account private agreements between providers and patients which reflect pa-
tients' economic choices); see also Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening
the Screws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 985 (1986) (noting that most doctors and commentators fear
increased tort liability only during transition from high resource-use practice style under cost based
reimbursement to lower resource-use styles under prospective payment or capitation system, but argu-
ing that tort doctrine can be refined to deal with cost-effective medical decisions by focusing on institu-
tional setting rather than on individual practitioner).
93. See Furrow, supra note 92. Other reform proposals rely on legislative initiatives to redirect
most malpractice claims away from the tort system. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insur-
ance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1252-56; O'Connell, Neo-No Fault Remedies
for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125 (1986).
94. Saks, In Search of the "Lawsuit Crisis", 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 77 (1986).
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ceed, the claims of these groups need to be understood and, in some cases,
accommodated.
A. Bitter Pills for Providers: Reduced Incomes and Changing Practice
Styles
Competitive reform of health care financing and delivery, if successful,
will precipitate two unpleasant consequences for physicians: incomes will
fall and practice styles will change. For hospitals, the forecast is equally
severe: many acute care facilities may fail as services are delivered in less
costly settings. If these disruptive effects are not addressed in advance,
political repercussions from the affected interest groups could cut short
pro-competitive policy initiatives. More important, of course, are the eco-
nomic consequences of the twin precipitants of competition-lowered pro-
vider incomes and improved technical efficiency. The questions to be
asked, then, are whether the economic losses to providers result in lower-
quality health service or other side effects which would offset any cost
savings that competition may produce and whether rationing is an inevita-
ble byproduct of intensified competition.
To place competition's potential effects on providers in proper perspec-
tive, we must first recognize that health costs represent nothing more than
the gross incomes of all providers of health care and their suppliers. Thus,
improved performance in the health care industry necessarily implies low-
ering those incomes or reducing technical inefficiency in the system or
both.9" Competition therefore tends to reduce incomes in the health care
industry directly. With that decrease come disruptions in current practice
arrangements96 and, the argument goes, deterioration in the quality of the
health care workers.
However, there appears to be little economic support for this argument.
Even though it is possible for lower professional and managerial incomes
to deter talented individuals from entering those professions (and thereby
lower the quality of care the system produces), the experiences of coun-
tries that have capped increases in professional incomes, such as Canada
95. R. Evans, The Spurious Dilemma: Reconciling Medical Progress and Cost Control (Mar.
1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
96. Physicians have long been accustomed to practice arrangements that permitted almost un-
checked professional discretion and autonomy in practicing medicine. See P. S'TARR, supra note 16, at
198-232. This freedom has permitted physicians to avoid many of the burdens of the corporate form,
such as hierarchical controls, division of labor through team arrangements and other forms of coordi-
nation, and the need to generate their own sources of capital. Id. Disruption of these accustomed
patterns of doing business and usurpation of long-standing "professional norms" may arguably make
the practice of medicine less attractive. On the other side, as discussed below, displacement of these
practices or norms may often permit more cost-effective ways of rendering care to develop. See infra
note 98 and accompanying text.
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and Great Britain, does not support this theory.9" With the prospect of
more efficient matching of professional tasks to professional skills, greater
use of teaming in administering care, and the potential lessening of ad-
ministrative and other nonpractice burdens, it is possible that the attrac-
tiveness (or the opportunity costs) of practicing medicine will not be di-
minished at all.98 In short, there are strong reasons to doubt that current
income levels fix human capital and output optimally.
More importantly, the potential for reducing technical inefficiency in
the health care system carries with it the prospect that competition can
generate significant savings without sacrificing quality or substantial pro-
vider income. Epidemiologic studies of regional variations in medical prac-
tice styles offer evidence that the nation's health needs could be met at
lower costs without sacrificing quality or rationing care. One study has
shown four- to ten-fold variations in hospital admission rates and resource
usage over a large range of surgical and medical DRGs." Strong regional
differences in the intensity and cost of medical care without corresponding
variances in health benefits support the argument that there is technical
inefficiency that can be removed from the system. Similarly, a recent re-
view of medical records from 1982 to 1984 found that twenty-three per-
cent of hospital admissions were for treatment that could have been pro-
vided in a doctor's office or clinical setting, and that an additional
seventeen percent of surgical admissions could have been performed on an
out-patient basis.100 The private sector has demonstrated that it can make
effective use of this kind of research. Based on studies indicating that as
much as twenty percent of laboratory and medical testing may be unnec-
essary, Blue Cross and Blue Shield recently announced guidelines to con-
trol reimbursement for such tests.10 1
97. Evans, Finding the Levers, Finding the Courage: Lessons from Cost Containment in North
America, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 585 (1986); Klein, Why Britain's Conservatives Support a
Socialist Health Care System, HEALTH Arr., Spring 1985, at 41.
98. Evans, supra note 97. For an analysis of studies showing economies of scale in physician
practices and that physicians tend to work in groups smaller than the most efficient size, see P. FELD-
STEIN, supra note 15, at 178-81, and Frech & Ginsburg, Optimal Scale in Medical Practice: A
Survivor Analysis, 47 J. OF Bus. 23 (1974); see also Tarlov, HMO Enrollment Growth and Physi-
cians: The Third Compartment, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1986, at 23 (consequences of increased unen-
cumbered physician time include more time with patients, more continuing medical education and
teaching, more time to care for poor).
99. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEAITH AFF.,
Summer 1984, at 38; Wennberg, McPherson & Caper, Will Payment Based on Diagnostic-Related
Groups Control Hospital Costs?, 311 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 295, 295-99 (1984).
100. Siu, Sonnenberg, Manning, Goldberg, Bloomfield, Newhouse & Brook, Inappropriate Use
of Hospitals in a Randomized Trial of Health Insurance Plans, 315 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1259
(1986).
101. New Guidelines on Giving Tests in Medical Care, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at A-12, col.
1; see also Linn, Yager, Leake, Gastaldo & Palkowski, Differences in the Numbers and Costs of Tests
Ordered By Internists, Family Physicians and Psychiatrists, 21 INQUIRY 266 (1984) (wide variations
in tests ordered for hypothetical patient, both between and among medical specialties).
Yale Journal on Regulation
Epidemiologic evidence thus tends to refute the contention made by
some economic theorists"0 2 that the market efficiently resolves uncertainty
in medicine only by delegating complete discretion to physicians. Un-
checked discretion seems only to compound uncertainty and encourage
waste. If technical inefficiency can be reduced, savings can coexist with the
continued quantity and quality of care. Thus, the income losses and dis-
ruption of existing practice arrangements that providers are likely to expe-
rience do not necessarily affect lower total health care or system-wide
quality.
From this perspective it can be argued that the rationing debate is sim-
ply an effort to divert attention from the private economic interests that
are at stake.' 3 Even if rationing is a red herring, there is another serious
consideration. Changing payment patterns may displace certain private
cross-subsidies, thereby causing a redistribution of health resources away
from those most in need of them.
B. The Uninsured and the Poor
The inattentiveness of competitive reform advocates to the effects of
market-driven policies on the uninsured and the poor is surprising on two
counts. First, the magnitude of the problem commands attention. The
simple, compelling economic fact is that a great deal of indigent care will
be squeezed out of the existing system as private and public hospitals ad-
just their policies to accommodate the price demands of payers in a com-
petitive market. In all but a few states, alternative methods for financing
and delivering this displaced indigent care are not even on the horizon.
The second cause for surprise is pragmatic. Further medical neglect of the
poor and an increased burden on other social services can only undermine
public confidence in market-based policies and strengthen the call for gov-
ernmental control of health care.
Hospitals in the United States have engineered a massive social service
system to provide primary and secondary care to the poor by arranging
for private insurance, and even some public programs like Medicare, to
cross-subsidize the care hospitals provide to indigents. In 1984, one esti-
mate states that some $5.7 billion of uncompensated care was provided by
hospitals, of which $1.7 billion represented charity care and the remainder
bad debts.' 4 Admittedly, reliable data are lacking. For example, the
102. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 29.
103. R. Evans, supra note 95, at 7.
104. Mulstein, The Uninsured and the Financing of Uncompensated Care: Scope, Costs and
Policy Options, 21 INQUIRY 214, 219 (1984).
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boundary between charity and bad debt care is to some degree a matter of
accounting convention.1"' Moreover, although some care provided to indi-
viduals able, but unwilling, to pay is collectible, hospitals lack incentives
to pursue these debts. These reservations aside, there can be little doubt
that considerable health resources are diverted to the poor and uninsured
because hospitals act as de facto social service agencies. As hospitals in-
creasingly compete for the patient base of HMOs, self-insured employers,
and PPOs, they will almost certainly reduce the funds they use to subsi-
dize care provided to the uninsured. As each payer insists on the lowest
price, discretionary hospital budget items like uncompensated care will be
sacrificed. 06
There is a compelling case for restoring, at a minimum, the quantum of
health care services displaced by competitive reform. With some thirty-five
million citizens without health insurance and nearly one-half of the poor
ineligible for Medicaid, the population vulnerable to the erosion of cross-
subsidies is considerable.10 7 Furthermore, those figures underestimate the
true social cost of weakening the health care safety net. Lost wages, re-
duced income taxes, increased health costs due to reduced early detection
and treatment, and new demands on other social services represent some
of the additional consequences of tightening indigent-care budgets.
Refocusing the rhetoric of the debate would be helpful here.108 Provid-
105. The extent to which hospitals classify uncompensated care as bad debt or charity care varies
considerably and does not appear to rest on any accepted standard. Id. at 219-20.
106. It has been argued that, despite private cross-subsidy's inefficiency, it must be kept because
more redistributive plans are politically inexpedient. See, e.g., Schuck, Designing Hospital Care Sub-
sidies For the Poor, in UNCOMPENSATED HoSPITAL CARE: RI(;HTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 12,
80-83. However, recent events in the health care industry make this claim unrealistic. As discussed in
this section, the drop in profit margins caused by competition has greatly diminished private support
of indigent care. As open-ended cost-based reimbursement seems unlikely to return, we should make
indigent care part of the public debate.
107. In 1984, 35.1 million people, 17% of the population under age 65, had no medical insurance,
public or private. Only 46% of those below federal poverty standards are currently eligible for Medi-
caid. B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JosT & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 79, at 569. Although the
original intention of sponsors of the Medicaid program was to encourage states to extend coverage to
all indigent persons, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 303 (1969), repealed Pub. L. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1484 (1972),
state and federal budget reductions and eligibility rules have caused Medicaid coverage of the poor to
decline. See Dallek, Health Care for America's Poor: Separate and Unequal, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE
RFv. 361, 362-63 (1986).
108. Recent efforts to expand public health insurance programs have focused on concerns about
"catastrophic" coverage for the elderly. On July 22, 1987, the House of Representatives, by a vote of
302-127, passed H.R. 2740, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., to amend Title XVIII of the Social Security Act
to provide protection from catastrophic medical expenses under the Medicare program. 133 CONG.
REG. H6545 (daily ed. July 22, 1987). Recipients must meet a $520 annual hospitalization deductible
in 1987 and a $500 annual prescription drug deductible in 1989. There is no long-term health care
(nursing home or home care) coverage. Home care visits are covered for only 35 days. There is a limit
of $1043 on Part B out-of-pocket expenses. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the
new benefits will cost $33 billion over five years. House Passes Catastrophic Protection Plan,
HEAI:rH LAW. NEWS REP., Aug. 1987, at 1. Though it serves a laudable objective, this costly pro-
gram does not significantly alleviate the problems of the uninsured and the indigent. The considerable
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ing displaced indigent care can be distinguished from proposals to put new
welfare burdens on society. What was once provided by private subsidies
should not be withdrawn simply because public agencies must now do the
redistributing. Moreover, additional indigent health care funded from part
of the competitive dividend resulting from more efficient delivery systems,
redirected provider incentives, and other sources does not entail new social
outlays. One might even hope that the policy debate could consider that
the health care system could produce a more equitable distribution of the
fifty billion dollar tax subsidy effected through exclusion of employer
health insurance contributions.1"' In sum, policymakers, confronted with a
fundamental reordering of the health care system, should be encouraged to
see competition as affording opportunities to increase basic health services
to the poor and not as a ploy to exacerbate, sub silentio, existing inequi-
ties in access to care.110
One common misconception finds greater support for indigent care in-
consistent with competition among providers and health plans. Indeed,
one argument forcefully advanced on behalf of all-payer rate-setting
schemes is their success in spreading the costs of indigent care. 1 How-
ever, there is no reason why states employing competitive approaches can-
not finance expanded indigent care while also equitably distributing the
financial burdens of that care." Some states, for example, levy a tax on
the net revenues of hospitals to finance indigent care, yet encourage com-
petition among health plans. Notably, Florida's indigent-care pool is not
linked to any rate-setting program. 1 ' Thus, the considerable savings real-
enthusiasm for this type of proposal reflects the political difficulties of restricting health care financing
in a manner that will provide a minimum level of health care.
109. Enthoven, Health Tax Policy Mismatch, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1985, at 5, 7.
110. Embedded in these issues is the question of what kind of health care policy reform is prefer-
able given limited resources and political constraints. For example, legislation to grant the elderly
catastrophic coverage carries significant costs, is not progressively structured, and does little to allevi-
ate the problem of care for indigents. See supra note 108. At the same time, it is a politically popular
form of social insurance that is closely aligned with traditional conceptions of social insurance in the
United States. See, e.g., Marmor, American Medical Policy and the Crisis of the Welfare State: A
Comparative Perspective, 11 J. HEALTH Poi.. PoCY & L. 617 (1986).
111. See, e.g., Calkins, Assuring Access In a Changing Health Care System, 63 BULL. N.Y.
AAD. MEtD. 93, 97-98 (1987). But see Meyer, supra note 66, at 178-80 (all-payer rate-regulation
does not eliminate cost-shifting; rather, it moves costs to Medicare and hospitals, thus producing only
slight decline in overall health care costs). A recent study shows that costs continue to be shifted under
all-payer regulation, but that overall health care costs nevertheless decline. Zuckerman, Commercial
Insurers and All-Payer Regulation: Evidence on Hospitals' Response to Financial Need, 6 J.
HEALIH ECON. 165, 180 (1987).
112. See Meyer, supra note 66, at 180-83 (proposes voucher system to replace existing indigent-
care reimbursement methods, as it would encourage use of such efficient delivery systems as HMOs
and PPOs). New York has provided for expanded indigent care in its all-payer regulation, which has
resulted in a 22% rise in total bed-days devoted to uninsured care from 1982 to 1985, Thorpe, supra
note 66, at 399.
113. Lewin & Lewin, Health Care and the Uninsured, 1 Bus. & HEAL:rH 9, 13 (1984).
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ized by employing selective contracting in state Medicaid programs may
be used to support efforts to provide care to those affected by the reduction
in hospital cost shifting.
There are, however, reasons to doubt that without federal incentives or
compulsion states will adopt competitive strategies for financing care for
the medically indigent. Even less promising are prospects that state indi-
gent care programs would seek to offset lost care previously supplied
through hospital cost shifting. Despite their capacity to realize cost sav-
ings, capitated programs incur high start-up and administrative costs.114
The ability 1 5 and willingness 16 of most states to undertake costly innova-
tions in financing indigent care is highly questionable. States participating
in the Medicaid program have been unwilling to pay for the medically
indigent: most states have failed to expand eligibility or to adopt the high-
est allowable income limits and have declined to cover all optional eligibil-
ity categories."'
In sum, selective contracting and other competitive techniques can help
introduce efficiency and improve the operation of public programs as well
as private financing systems. However, failure to address the loss of cross-
subsidies and continued neglect of the medically indigent may prove com-
petition's downfall. Unless steps are taken to resolve these issues as com-
petitive reform measures are adopted, political support for those measures
may wane.
C. Teaching Hospitals
Teaching hospitals in the United States provide a number of unique
health care products financed in large part by the general patient revenues
of those institutions. These include graduate medical education, research,
the testing of new technologies, and certain highly specialized services." 8
As with uncompensated care, price competition among acute care hospi-
tals will erode the margins that teaching hospitals currently use to cross-
subsidize these special products. Unless academic medical centers develop
specific mechanisms to finance testing, teaching, and research extramu-
rally, they will have little choice but to reduce significantly expenditures
devoted to those products.
114. See Freund & Neuschler, supra note 23, at 27-29.
115. See Schuck, supra note 106, at 78-80 (indigent-care subsidies should be organized federally
because of federal leverage and regulatory control, federal administrative capacity, and need to avoid
state competition to lower welfare benefits); see also Thompson, supra note 22, at 655-62.
116. Bovbjerg & Kopt, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private Op-
tions, 19 IND. L. REV. 857, 898-99, 912-13 (1986).
117. Id.
118. Colloton, Competition: The Threat to Teaching Hospitals, in FINANCINc. HFAI:rH CARE:
COMPirToN VERSUS REGUI.A'ION 131, 140-42 (D. Yaggy & W. Anlyan eds. 1982).
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Although the existing health care financing system may overproduce
these products or inefficiently allocate resources to their production, it does
not follow that a public policy of benign neglect is appropriate. The posi-
tive externalities of research, testing, and some aspects of medical educa-
tion make it likely that market mechanisms will systematically underfund
their production.119 Not only is a market-based approach unlikely to
devote sufficient resources to these services, but it places the onus of with-
drawing cross-subsidies primarily upon the teaching hospitals. Placing
that responsibility on such diverse and decentralized institutions raises
questions of efficiency and equity. Therefore, though some may argue that
existing cross-subsidies produce too many specialists or wastefully favor
certain kinds of technologies and modalities, these problems do not justify
the lack of a coordinated national policy to permit some subsidization to
counter the problem of externalities. Even so, state and federal authorities
appear content to await proof that a catastrophic problem is at hand.
Instead of waiting, there are several possible approaches to the problem
of underfunding education, research, technological experimentation and
highly specialized services. A fund for research and teaching services pro-
vided by public hospitals might be financed out of a surcharge on the
premiums of all insurance and delivery plans. 2 Alternatively, teaching
and research might be supported out of general tax revenues. Of course,
difficult problems remain. For example, such a program must assure that
the more efficient teaching hospitals are rewarded. Then, too, the identity
of the fund administator and the existence and details of the review system
remain open questions, as does the means by which we insulate the sys-
tem from political pressures, especially pressures from entrenched medical
interest groups. The great public benefits associated with medical research
and medical education, at least to the extent that research and education
encourage greater physician diversity and wider dispersal of practice loca-
tions, require that the policy debate begin to address these problems.
IV. Promoting Competition Does Not Eliminate the Need for Govern-
mental Regulation
Several factors contribute to the need for regulation of some aspects of
the health care market. First, information is difficult to gather and ana-
119. An externality occurs when someone produces a good or service that has effects on others.
Products such as research and the testing of new technologies are examples of positive externali-
ties-undertakings that produce benefits for which the producer cannot collect. The case for govern-
mental subsidies for those activities is usually strong. Whether there are similar external benefits in
funding a greater number of physicians, however, is controversial among economists. P. FELDSTEIN,
supra note 15, at 405-07.
120. Colloton, supra note 118, at 215.
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lyze and is asymmetrically distributed among patients, providers, and pay-
ers. 2 ' Individual consumers and even sophisticated third-party payers
find it difficult to determine when services are needed and which services
are the most cost effective. Second, insurance markets are subject to ad-
verse selection and are highly sensitive to such vagaries of the legal system
as changing malpractice standards. Finally, the industry's history of trade
restraints and the public's longstanding acceptance of the sovereignty of
the medical profession suggest that competitive health care markets are
highly vulnerable to professional collusion. While part of competition's
appeal lies in its capacity to mitigate market failures, underlying imper-
fections of the kind described above persist even in competitive health
markets. These characteristics of health care help identify some areas for
government intervention. A few examples of procompetitive regulation are
discussed below.
A. Improving the Flow of Information
Providers, concerned about malpractice risks, reputations, and competi-
tive positions, have strong incentives to keep secret all quality and out-
come data. Indeed, organized medicine has actively resisted governmental
efforts to improve information flow. For example, hospital trade groups
and the American Medical Association (AMA) have opposed efforts to
require that PROs make public practitioner-specific information.12 ' The
government can help alleviate information problems in several ways. As
both the regulator of health professionals and institutions and the pur-
chaser of health services, the government can efficiently gather, process,
and distribute information that is comprehensible and that will help com-
petitive markets function. For example, public agencies can monitor
health and medical outcomes. They could then pass along to buyers both
aggregate information reflecting the efficacy of different kinds of delivery
systems or treatments and provider-specific information that could help
buyers make judgments on price, quality, and utilization.
Governmental agencies are best equipped to provide such information
121. Information in health care is costly and difficult to acquire because of its complexity, the
uncertainties surrounding diagnosis and treatment, and professional eflorts to limit its availability and
use. See Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 16, at 528-31. In addition, physicians, by virtue of their
training and direct experience with the patient, have far greater information about the nature and
severity of an illness and treatment options than do either patients or payers. ld.; see also P. FELD-
STIN, supra note 15, at 260; Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcON.
RE;v. 531 (1968).
122. See Hospitals Rap Release of Mortality Rate Data, AMERICAN MED. NE.ws, Mar. 21, 1986,
at 1; see also The Patient Has a Right to Know, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1984, at A18, col. 1. Attempts
to secure release of such data under the Freedom of Information Act have been unsuccessful. Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. HEW, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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at low costs and, where necessary, to preserve confidentiality or place lim-
itations on the dissemination of disclosed information. Unfortunately, ef-
forts by the Department of Justice and others to compel the release of
peer review data concerning practice patterns, utilization, and outcomes
have been only partially successful.' Legislation designed to improve in-
formation flows has also neglected the competitive benefits of wider dis-
semination. The recently enacted Health Care Quality Assurance Act'24
empowers the federal government to gather information on disciplinary
actions undertaken by hospitals, state boards, and other bodies, but se-
verely restricts disclosure of that information. The Act specifically prohib-
its disclosure to employers, insurers, and the public' 25-the very groups
that could use such information to make more informed and cost-effective
choices of providers.
Recent problems with Medicare risk-contract HMOs"2 6 might also be
reduced were the government to improve information flow. The quality
and marketing practices of such HMOs have lately been questioned. Al-
leged abuses include the use of misleading promotions and the failure to
advise beneficiaries of their options and rights.'27 These abuses stem from
inherent problems with market-based programs in which consumers can-
not gather and use information as effectively as they must to make ra-
tional choices. Indeed, as suggested below, even sophisticated individuals
may best be represented by agents, such as employers and third-party
payers, who have the time and experience to bargain effectively. 2 More-
over, if unscrupulous practices become the norm, scrupulous providers
will suffer from the bad reputation of the unscrupulous.' 2 9 For these rea-
123. See Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Carolyne K. Davis, Health
Care Financing Admin. of the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. (June 25, 1984) (discussing
proposed regulations authorizing disclosure of hospital-specific information while protecting confiden-
tiality of individual practitioners, utilization, and practice patterns) (on file with author). Reversing its
earlier position, the federal government has recently authorized the release of hospital mortality data.
See HHS To Release Hospital-Specific Mortality Data, HEAIIH LAW. NEws REP., Sept. 1987, at 1.
Governmental failure to collect information from private groups, share information within, or release
information to the public has contributed greatly to inadequate physician monitoring. See Kusserow,
Handley & Yessian, An Overview of State Medical Discipline, 257 J. A.M.A. 820, 823-24 (1987).
124. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3743, 3784 (to be
codilied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52).
125. Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 11134(b).
126. Medicare risk-contract HMOs provide all Medicare benefits for a fixed cost for each en-
rollee, bearing the risk if actual costs exceed the fixed payment. As of March 1, 1987, about three
percent of the Medicare population were enrolled in such HMOs. MINORIY S'rAFF OF SENATE
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICARE AND HMOs: A FIRST LOOK,
WITH DISIURBIN; FINDINGS ii (Comm. Print 1987).
127. Id. at 712, 2025.
128. See infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
129. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970) (consumers, often risk-averse, make market decisions based in large part
on general reputation, especially where specific information is lacking).
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sons, the government should at least set standards and marketing controls
for HMOs. It might prove better still for the government to exercise its
buying power to negotiate regulated capitation contracts for plans serving
Medicare beneficiaries.
B. Using Licensure and Other Regulatory Tools to Promote Quality of
Care
The rapid growth of competition also requires that public agencies reg-
ulate professional competence more carefully. Many private quality-
assurance mechanisms in medicine, such as professional norms and infor-
mal protocols, referral practices, and informal peer oversight, at present
have only limited effectiveness. 3 ' They would prove even less effective in
competition-driven markets.' 3 ' Quality-assurance mechanisms regarded as
capable of dealing with difficult information and enforcement problems
are principally regulatory and controlled by governmental agencies.' Al-
though increased governmental supervision of quality standards may at
first seem incompatible with competitive markets, regulatory intervention
is essential to overcome market failures that could undermine the effec-
tiveness of competitive reform.
There are reasons to doubt the effectiveness of existing regulatory
mechanisms. Restrictions on the availability of new physicians and the
ability of nonphysicians to practice have been relaxed considerably in re-
cent years. As a result, many new practitioners have entered the mar-
ket.' 3 However, governmental licensure, an important means of control-
ling the quality of professional services and reducing the need for other
forms of intervention to assure public safety, has not effectively adjusted to
the changing health-care-professional labor market. For example, a large
percentage of new physicians have graduated from medical schools outside
the United States; in nine states, over forty percent of all new medical
licenses were awarded to foreign medical graduates. 34 State licensing
130. See Jost, supra note 61, at 12-19.
131. Private groups reviewing quality control are likely to lose their autonomy as third-party
payers bargain directly over competitive variables. Organizational hierarchies controlled by payers are
likely to replace or assume greater control over profession-sponsored bodies, though they will still need
professional expertise.
132. See Jost, supra note 61, at 58-60.
133. The number of physicians in the United States has steadily increased, outstripping the per-
centage growth in the nation's population since 1970. In 1970 there were 137 medical doctors per
100,000 people, while in 1980 there were 172 and in 1982 there were 184. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 103 (1986). For the
year 2000 one estimate projects a ratio of 233 doctors per 100,000 people. See Tarlov, supra note 98,
at 23-25.
134. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTIOR GEN., OFFICE
OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW 5 (1986)
[hereinafter MEDICAL LICENSURE].
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boards and private credentialling entities lack the information and ability
to assess adequately the credentials and abilities of these practitioners. A
recent governmental study concluded that state licensing boards are inade-
quate for the task of assessing the medical education offered by foreign
schools and that testing and residency programs do not appear to have
improved significantly quality assurance through licensure.' 35
Similarly, both public licensing agencies and government reimburse-
ment programs have been extraordinarily lax about sanctioning incompe-
tent physicians. A significant number of health professionals are incompe-
tent or suffer some impairment of their ability to practice." 6 In spite of
this problem, state and federal governments have all but abdicated respon-
sibility for disciplining physicians. A report by the Office of the Inspector
General of HHS concluded that state licensing boards are highly ineffec-
tive in imposing disciplinary sanctions based on incompetence or malprac-
tice. 3 ' Despite estimates that up to 75,000 physicians are impaired or
incompetent, boards revoked licenses only 255 times in 1984 and 406
times in 1985.138
The states' ineffectual record in disciplining physicians is traceable to a
number of factors. Most importantly, state boards have severe financial
constraints that limit greatly their ability to police physician compe-
tence." 9 Other elements include the legal standards and procedures appli-
cable in such proceedings and the inadequacy or absence of mandatory
reporting requirements and information-sharing procedures among pri-
vate and public entities involved in health care quality supervision.""
Medicare and other public reimbursement programs also have failed to
eliminate providers who have been found incompetent or impaired. This
135. Id. at i.
136. The Department of Health and Human Services has estimated that between 5% and 15% of
all physicians are impaired because of alcohol or drug dependency, incompetence, or failure to keep
abreast of developments. See Rural Rides, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1987, at 29; see also Brill, Curing
Doctors, AM. LAW., Sept. 1985, at 1, 13.
137. MEDICAL LICENSURE, supra note 134, at ii.
138. See Rural Rides, supra note 136, at 30.
139. In 1986, the Inspector General's office reported a sharp increase in disciplinary actions by
state boards. Brinkley, State Medical Boards Disciplined Record Number of Doctors in 1986, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1986, at A6, col. 1. It is not clear that this rise reflects a significant increase in
enforcement. Id.
140. MEDICAL. LICENSURE, supra note 134, at 14-18. Although the number of disciplinary ac-
tions against physicians has increased recently, the increase in major actions, such as revocation, sus-
pension, and probation, has been quite small. Kusserow, Handley & Yessian, supra note 123, at 822.
The Office of the Inspector General concludes that budget constraints, inadequate information-
sharing, and legal obstacles prevent state boards from policing physicians adequately. Id. at 822-24;
see also Derbyshire, How Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 193 (1983);
Dolan & Urban, The Determinants of the Effectiveness of Medical Disciplinary Boards: 1960-1977,
7 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 203, 210-16 (1983) (efficacy of medical licensing boards inversely propor-
tional to physician dominance, though all lack substantial efficacy); Jost, supra note 61.
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record underscores government's neglect of minimum quality standards.
In the past, reimbursement has rarely, if ever, been refused to providers
on the basis of incompetence or impaired ability to practice medicine. Al-
though the Inspector General of HHS recently exercised his authority to
refuse reimbursement to a handful of rural physicians, the litigation and
political resistance from the AMA generated by this action illustrate the
obstacles to improved governmental oversight.141
Thus, state and federal authorities have not adapted the necessary li-
censure and other regulatory mechanisms for ensuring quality in order to
keep pace with the demands of changing conditions in health care labor
markets. Although political impediments may hinder their progress, gov-
ernmental agencies are well-positioned to use these tools to help consum-
ers overcome information problems. Moreover, by doing so they may
lessen the need for more invasive forms of quality regulation.
C. Providing Incentives for Using Cost-Effective Delivery Systems
A superficially appealing argument claims that now that competition
has arrived government should treat all insurance and delivery systems
equally. It is argued that the time has come to eliminate laws encouraging
development of HMOs, such as those permitting federally-qualified
HMOs to mandate that employers offer the HMO option or those requir-
ing equal contributions. 42 While there may be cause to review the effec-
tiveness of those laws, it is premature to discard the policy of encouraging
consumers to choose more cost-effective health systems.
First, in the near term it is unlikely that health plans will compete
sufficiently with orthodox delivery systems to discipline most markets. 4
Although alternative delivery systems have grown rapidly, it may be some
time before they approach the critical mass necessary to change overall
practice styles, influence the path of new technological development, and
141. See Rural Rides, supra note 136, at 30. The Department of Health and Human Services
recently acceded to a number of the AMA's procedural demands. Doctors Gain Rights in Medicare
Quality Reviews, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
142. Health Maintenance Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-7 (1982). The HMO Act
permits federally qualified HMOs to require employers with 25 or more employees to offer one staff
or group model HMO and one IPA model HMO. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Such
employers are also required to make contributions to HMOs equal to contributions made to other
insurance plans offered by the employers. The original HMO Act has been criticized as ineffective, if
not actually harmful, in promoting HMOs. See, e.g., H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG, PUBLIC INSURANCE
IN PRIVATE MEDICAL MARKETS: SOME PROBLEMS WITH NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (1978).
However, 42 C.F.R. § 110.808(a) (1986) lessens some of the more objectionable effects by, amomg
other things, limiting HMO payments by the employer to the amount that would be paid under a
collective bargaining agreement or some other employer-employee contract.
143. As of mid-1986, only 12%-13% of the privately paying market was enrolled in some form of
HMO, PPO, or other health plan. Enthoven, Managed Competition in Health Care and the Unfin-
ished Agenda, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 105, 105 (Supp. 1986).
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affect input costs. Second, it is unrealistic to assume that long-established
health care relationships, preferences, and attitudes can be quickly over-
come in local markets merely by making available the option of choosing
an alternative delivery system." 4 A health plan, like any new entrant in a
competitive market, faces learning curves, economies of scale, and reputa-
tional entry barriers that may take time to overcome.14
As discussed above, litigation and the changing regulatory climate have
mitigated, but not eliminated, the principal obstacles confronting alterna-
tive health care systems. However, tax policies, private trade restraints
and governmental policies that favor the purchase of comprehensive in-
demnity health insurance continue to have an important influence in slow-
ing the pace of procompetitive change in the health care industry." 6 Con-
sequently, encouraging consumers to choose cost-effective delivery plans
remains justified. In essence, laws favoring alternative delivery systems are
a second-best means of countering long-standing but politically unassaila-
ble policies that have fostered wasteful reimbursement methods. Besides
favoring the retention of regulations favoring HMOs and other competi-
tive plans, this reasoning supports new policy initiatives. Tax incentives
should be provided that encourage employees to choose more efficient
plans. Also, incentives for employers to offer multiple health plans and
other forms of affirmative regulation can help plans gain wider
acceptance.
D. Regulating to Avoid Risk Selection and Other Insurance Market
Failures
Competition advocates dispute which regulatory mechanisms are needed
to prevent risk selection and other market failures associated with insur-
ance markets. As critics of competitive reform have noted, insurers may
find it far easier to earn profits by seeking out healthy consumers who will
have less costly claims than by operating more efficiently. 47 Similarly,
adverse selection can occur: less healthy consumers will choose more com-
prehensive plans, thus forcing disproportionately high risks on some in-
144. See Luft, Maerki & Trauner, The Competitive Effects of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions: Another Look at the Evidence from Hawaii, Rochester, and Minneapolis/St. Paul, 10 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & L. 625 (1985) (finding no widespread cost-containing response in communi-
ties with sizeable HMO enrollments and concluding that local systems' reactions and responses to
increased competitive pressures may be slow).
145. See P. FELDSrEIN, supra note 15, at 344-45, 353-55 (discussing effects of consumer infor-
mation, business group and union attitudes, and professional resistance on acceptance of HMOs);
Enthoven, supra note 143, at 112-13.
146. For an excellent analysis of tax incentives and their effect on health insurance, see Enthoven,
supra note 109. On private restraints of trade, see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1067, 1084 (1981).
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surers. These phenomena, called biased selections, 48 tend to cause compe-
tition to unravel, decreasing the social benefits of insurance as the healthy
stop subsidizing the sick and, ultimately, undermining the risk-spreading
function of insurance.' 49 Health insurance markets are subject to other
problems as well. Individuals may free-ride on the availability of health
insurance, signing up for certain health coverage only when they expect to
need care shortly. In addition, market segmentation is possible; health
plans may design their benefits, tailor promotions, or locate providers in
ways that reduce competitive interaction among plans.' While some
product differentiation is desirable, excessive segmentation may under-
mine price competition among plans.
One approach to these problems, proposed in Alain Enthoven's Con-
sumer Choice Health Plan (CCHP), relies on extensive government regu-
lation of health plans. 5 ' Comprehensive federal requirements would
standardize benefit packages, require community rating by actuarial cate-
gories, set enrollment practices, and assure minimum quality standards for
all health plans." 2 Apart from the political problems associated with the
sweeping legislative changes CCHP requires, it may be criticized because
it would unnecessarily burden competitive pricing and benefit-package de-
signing. In addition, it is unclear that CCHPs would be effective in the
long run. Community rating, for example, is not a particularly effective
means of redistributing medical care from high-income to low-income in-
dividuals. 5 It may also be economically inefficient by reducing the over-
all amount of insurance purchased as more low-risk purchasers are driven
to self-insure.
Clark Havighurst 5 and, recently, Enthoven himself'5 ' have suggested
that employers, third-party payers, and other sponsors can be relied upon
to take steps to guard against the risks described above. According to this
view, employers act as informed purchasers and counteract the insurance
market's deficiencies. This approach effectively shifts to employers the re-
148. The term biased selection refers to situations in which an insurer draws a set of enrollees
from a risk pool with such high or low utilization rates that premiums and claims diverge. Biased
selection may be adverse or favorable depending on whether premiums exceed claims-related ex-
penses. Although health insurers necessarily subsidize some of the ill, biased selection can lead to
inequities and barriers to expanded health insurance coverage because insurers must raise premiums
or leave the market. See T. McGuire, Financing and Reimbursement for Mental Health Services
9-11 (January 26, 1987) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
149. Wilensky & Rossiter, Patient Self-Selection in HMOs, HEAuI.t AFF., Spring 1986, at 66.
150. Enthoven, supra note 143, at 110.
151. A. EN'rHOVEN, supra note 32.
152. Id.
153. P. FFLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 155-59.
154. Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1117, 1154-56 (1981).
155. Enthoven, supra note 143, at 106.
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sponsibility for assuring cross-subsidization of the sick by the healthy and
to the government the subsidization of the poor by the rich. These assur-
ances leave uncertain the speed with which sponsors will begin to negoti-
ate efficiently with health plans, the extent of government's role in pro-
moting effective purchasing by sponsors, and the controls against risk
selection and other problems that will be needed for those not represented
by effective sponsors. The proponents of this approach need to insure that
public and private resources will prove adequate.
Finally, HMOs are already subject to state and federal regulations gov-
erning minimum benefit packages, enrollment practices and, to some ex-
tent, rate setting. 56 As HMOs and other alternative delivery systems be-
come more important, they may be regulated more. At the same time, self-
insurance is increasing as large employers create their own health financ-
ing systems. 57 As discussed above, many regulatory restrictions applicable
to HMOs and indemnity plans do not apply to self insurers. 58 The pre-
cise effects of this mixed regulatory environment are not yet well under-
stood. However, it is widely recognized that exemption from state regula-
tion has created strong incentives for employers to choose self-
insurance.' 5 9
Some claim that preempting state regulation, by encouraging low-risk
groups to self-insure, undermines state capacity to spread risks and ex-
pand access to health care.' It is more plausible that small employers,
forced to bear the increasing costs of state regulation by the spread of self-
insurance, will drop health coverage altogether. There is no evidence that
today's regulatory environment will reward efficient delivery systems and
there is every reason to suspect that it will penalize those unable to avoid
regulation. If so, a coordinated approach to health insurance deregulation
may be necessary to ensure the viability and credibility of market-based
solutions in health care.
156. See supra note 50.
157. See, e.g., McDonnell, Guttenberg, Greenberg & Arnett, Self-Insured Health Plans, 8
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 8 (1986) (50% of all employees with employment-related health
plans participate in self-insured plans); Goldsmith, Death of a Paradigm: The Challenge of Competi-
tion, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at 5.
158. See supra notes 29-54 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 147.
160. Law & Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case
Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1986) (federal preemption of state regulation may result
in higher fees and lower accessibility).
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Conclusion
Competition has come upon our health care system with little public
debate and has, at best, a weak political consensus in its support. We have
at present an enormously diverse and often inconsistent regulatory regime
that in some respects is still highly inhospitable to competition. In addi-
tion, the regulatory apparatus seems poorly equipped to deal with some of
the most difficult problems precipitated by the changes occurring in Amer-
ican medicine.
Some obstacles to competitive reform have readily identifiable, though
not costless, solutions. Increased governmental efforts can help in a num-
ber of areas. Greater attention to licensing, certification, and quality re-
view programs along with efforts to collect and disseminate data may help
overcome information problems and improve the performance of purchas-
ers in the market. Enhanced antitrust enforcement may deter private re-
straints of trade. Procompetitive legislation could repeal or meliorate such
laws as those inhibiting selective contracting, regulating capital expendi-
tures, setting administered prices, and perversely encouraging inefficient
care through tax burdens. Clearly, these are difficult problems, but they
are at least susceptible to reform. Other problems facing competitive
change appear less tractable. Assuring a decent minimum of care for the
medically indigent, addressing the malpractice problem, and avoiding ex-
cessive market segmentation by risk are challenging problems that will
require thoughtful responses as markets mature.
This Article has argued that competitive change is not self-effectuating.
With an unclear political consensus behind it, competition is vulnerable to
proposals that promise more immediate and more visible reform. If com-
petition advocates remain content with piecemeal deregulation and remain
reluctant to address the disruptive effects of competitive change, their
revolution may prove short-lived.

